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Malfitano v. County of Storey, 133 Nev. Adv. Op. 40 (June 29, 2017)1 
 
ADMINISTRATIVE AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  
STATUTORY VAGUENESS; DUE PROCESS; EQUAL PROTECTION 
 
Summary 
 
The term “satisfactory”, as used in county code providing for liquor licensing, was not 
unconstitutionally vague where the provision was not related to any civil or criminal penalty. 
Additionally, Respondents did not violate Appellant’s due process rights by denying his 
application for a liquor license because Appellant had no cognizable property interest in or 
entitlement to the license. Finally, Appellant’s equal protection rights were not violated because 
Respondents had a rational basis for denying Appellant’s application. 
 
Background 
 
Appellant Vincent Maltifano acquired two saloon casinos in Virginia City, Nevada but 
lacked the requisite gaming, liquor, and general business licenses to run the saloons himself. 
While a licensed third party ran the businesses, Maltifano applied for the three licenses. The 
Nevada Gaming Commission (“NGC”) was the first entity to deny Maltifano the required 
gaming license. The NGC denied Maltifano’s application for various reasons, including his 
“fail[ure] to demonstrate adequate business competence.” 
 
Maltifano then applied to the Storey County Board of County Commissioners and Liquor 
Board (collectively, the “Board”) for, respectively, a general business license and liquor license. 
The Board initially denied his applications because duplicate applications were not permitted, 
and the third party running the businesses already held the relevant licenses for both saloons. At 
the hearing, one of the Board’s Chairpersons assured Maltifano that the applications would be 
approved after the duplication issue had been resolved; however, the County Manager 
immediately clarified that the applications would be considered, but not necessarily approved.  
 
Maltifano resolved the issue by concluding his arrangement with the third party. He then 
obtained temporary licenses and re-applied to the Board for the requisite permanent licenses. 
However, citing Storey County Code (“SCC”) § 5.12.010(A), which requires the applicant to 
show “proof of financial standing to warrant an expected satisfactory and profitable business 
operation,” the Board denied Maltifano’s application for a liquor license a second time. 
 
Maltifano filed a petition for a writ of mandamus, alleging that: (1) the Board acted 
arbitrarily and capriciously in denying his applications; (2) the Board violated his due process 
and equal protection rights; and (3) SCC § 5.12.010(A) was unconstitutionally vague. The 
district court issued an order denying the writ petition. Maltifano appealed. 
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Discussion  
 
A district court’s decision on a petition for a writ of mandamus involving a question of 
law is reviewed de novo; however, a decision on a question that does not raise a question of law 
is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.2 The Court considered three issues: (1) whether the term 
“satisfactory,” as used in SCC § 5.12.010(A), was unconstitutionally vague; (2) whether 
Maltifano’s due process rights were violated; and (3) whether Maltifano’s equal protection rights 
were violated. 
 
Vagueness. The Court determined that SCC § 5.12.010(A) was not unconstitutionally 
vague because the provision did not create any civil or criminal penalty for failure to meet the 
“satisfactory” standard. Rather, an application failing to meet that standard may simply be 
denied. Additionally, ordinances that regulate matters of “public health, safety, morals, or 
general welfare”3 do not need to “prescribe detailed standards.”4 Moreover, the ordinance/code 
required the Board to base its decision on objective facts and criteria.  
 
Due Process. The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the Board did 
not violate Maltifano’s due process rights because Maltifano had no cognizable property interest 
or entitlement in the liquor license. First, the fact that Maltifano held a temporary license was not 
dispositive of an entitlement to the permanent license because the code expressly provided for 
the possibility that an application might be denied even though a temporary license had been 
issued.5 Second, the Court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that 
the statement by the Chairperson to Maltifano did not constitute a promise that the applications 
would be granted. Third, the Board’s history of liberally approving similar applications was 
irrelevant because “a constitutional entitlement cannot be created—as if by estoppel—merely 
because a wholly and expressly discretionary state privilege has been granted generously in the 
past.”6 
Equal Protection. The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the Board 
did not violate Maltifano’s equal protection rights because the Board had a rational basis for 
denying the application. The Board was aware that Maltifano had been denied a gaming license 
for various reasons directly related to Maltifano’s financial standing under the Storey County 
Code.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 The Court affirmed the district court’s order denying Appellant’s petition for a writ of 
mandamus for the reasons discussed above. 
																																																						
2  Veil v. Bennett, 131 Nev. Adv. Op. 22, 348 P.3d 684, 686 (2015). 
3  9 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 26:85 (3d ed. rev. 2016). 
4  Malfitano v. County of Storey, 133 Nev. Adv. Op. 40, at 7 (June 29, 2017) (citing Mills v. City of Henderson, 95 
Nev. 550, 552, 598 P.2d 635, 636 (1979). 
5 See id. at 10 (citing Storey County Code § 5.12.130). 
6  Id. at 11 (citing Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 465 (1981). 
